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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Case is an appeal of the District Court's Divorce Decree granting primary physical
custody of the minor children of Russell Peterson, Appellant, and Laura Peterson, Laura, to
Laura, with limited visitation to Russell.

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 6, 2009, Russell filed his Complaint for Divorce in Bonneville County, Idaho
(R. p. 1-6). Pursuant to later testimony, Russell filed his complaint because Laura told him she
was moving with the children to Utah the following day. Russell's complaint alleged
irreconcilable differences and sought joint legal and physical custody ofthe children together
with an equal division of the property. Attendant with the filing of the divorce, the Court of its
own volition entered a Joint Temporary and Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
CR. p. 12-13) and an Order to Attend Focus on Children Class CR. p. 11).
On August 7,2009, at 10:30 a.m., Laura was served with the Summons, Complaint for
Divorce, Joint Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (JTRO), and Order to
Attend Focus on Children Class, evidenced by the Affidavit of Service of Process (R. p. 14).
That same day she took the children to Utah, intending to permanently reside there with them.
On August 13,2009, Russell motioned the Court for an Ex Parte Order CR. p. 22) and
Writ of Assistance CR. p. 26), requiring the return of the parties' children to the state. An

Ex Parte Order was granted by the Court August 14,2009 CR. p. 37), and a Writ of Assistance
was issued (R. p. 38-39). Laura subsequently returned to Idaho with the children.
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On August 17,2009, the Court amended its Ex Parte Order and set a hearing for August
26,2009, to decide the longevity of the Ex Parte Order (R. p. 46-47).
Venue was changed to Jefferson County, Idaho, on August 17,2009 (R. p. 49-50).
Laura filed her counterclaim on October 15,2009, alleged the grounds for divorce on the
basis of extreme cruelty, and sought sole legal custody and joint physical custody of the children,
together with "reasonable supervised visitation" for Russell (R. p. 91-97).
During the pendency of the divorce proceeding, and after protracted pretrial litigation
leading up to temporary orders, the Court, On February 2,2010, granted Russell's motion for
custody evaluation to be completed through Ann Just with Family Court Services.
On March 23, 2010, in response to a Motion for Temporary Orders and after a bifurcated
hearing, the Court entered an order requiring the separation of the parties and Russell's removal
from the family home (R. p. 194-195). On March 29,2010, the Court entered an Amended Order
specifying the same and ordering parenting time for Russell two nights per week and every other
weekend (R. p. 204-206).

Peterson v. Peterson was inactive, as a matter of record or otherwise, from April 1, 2010,
until the Court served its Notice of Dismissal for Inactivity to both parties on September 2,2010
(R. p. 217). Laura filed a Motion for Retention September 14, 2010 (R. p. 218). On December 2,
2010, the Court issued an order setting the trial for March 2, 2011 (R. p. 229).
Dr. Ruby Walker submitted her custody evaluation to the Court on February 24, 2011,
which recommended an approximate equal sharing of legal and physical custody of the children.
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The trial of Peterson v. Peterson spanned three days, commencing March 2, 2011
(R. p. 287-291), continuing March 31, 2011 CR. p. 298-308), and concluding June 13,2011
(R. p. 332-335). Laura submitted her written closing statement on June 27, 2011 CR. p. 337-354).
Russell's written closing statement was received by the Court on June 28, 2011 (R. p. 355-378).
The Memorandum Decision was issued on July 28,2011 CR. p. 379-399) and was incorporated
into the Decree of Divorce entered August 19,2011.
The Memorandum Decision rendered by the Court granted the parties' divorce on the
basis of irreconcilable differences and granted Laura's request to move with the children to Utah
if she so chose CR. p. 379-399). The decision further granted joint legal and physical custody to
both parties but ordered parenting time for Russell only every other weekend, regardless of
whether or not Laura moved to Utah.
Russell filed his Notice of Appeal with the Court on August 23, 2011.
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Russell and Laura met at college in the summer of 1993 CR. p. 250). After courting for
three months, Russell disclosed to Laura a "personal challenge" of same-sex attraction
CR. p. 250). Both parties discussed the matter individually and with church leaders (R. p. 121).
They were encouraged to marry and were counseled that the issue would thereafter
spontaneously resolve CR. p. 121,251). They were married December 27, 1993 CR. p. 1).
In 1995, Russell completed a Master's Degree and the parties moved to Columbia, South
Carolina CR. p. 388) where Russell began attending a Ph.D. program in psychology
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(R. p. 251,386). On

a daughter, E. P., was born to the couple (R. p. 2). The

Peterson family moved from South Carolina back to Provo, Utah later in 1997 (R. p. 388).
In October, 1999, Russell and Laura had a son, W.P. (R. p. 2). Later in 1999, the family
moved from Provo, Utah to Shelley, Idaho (R. p. 388). In 2001, Russell began to work as a
therapist at the Behavioral Health Center in Idaho Falls. In November, 2002, Laura filed for
divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences (Tr. p. 380, L. 12-14) and the Court issued a
routine Joint Temporary and Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (JTRO). The parties
separated and Laura remained in the family horne in Shelley with the two children
(Tr. p. 498, L. 25, p. 499, L. 3). Russell lived with his parents in Idaho Falls. During the
Christmas (2002) holiday, the parties met to exchange children in Malad, Idaho
(Tr. p. 496, L. 20-22). In March of2003, the parties reconciled and the divorce action was
dismissed (R. p. 121).
In 2004, Russell and Laura sold their horne in Shelley, built a horne in the Rigby, Idaho
area, and relocated there (R. p. 388). In 2005 their third child, T. P., was born, and in
of

, Laura gave birth to twins, G. P. and J. P. (R. p. 2).
In June 2009, Russell was arrested and charged with misdemeanor indecent exposure and

misdemeanor public nuisance (R. p. 72-76). He bonded out and later pled guilty to the public
nuisance charge. The indecent exposure charge was dismissed.
In July 2009, he lost his part-time job at Behavioral Health Center. In August of 2009,
Russell resigned from his job at Idaho Department of Health and Welfare and started working
full-time for Mental Wellness Centers, Inc., in Idaho Falls (Tr. p. 44, L. 6; p. 46, L. 15).
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On August 6, 2009, Laura told Russell she was moving the children to Utah the next day
CR. p. 362). Since the divorce had not been filed and custody had not been contemplated nor
determined by a Court, Russell filed for divorce later on August 6, 2009, to place the children
under protection of a Joint Temporary and Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (JTRO)
and to prevent the loss of contact between Russell and the children CR. p. 362-363).
On August 7, 2009, at 10:30 a.m., Laura was served with the divorce complaint and
JTRO, which prohibited the children from being removed from the state for more than 72 hours
CR. p. 14). That day, Laura took the children out of state was gone continuously until August 17,
2009 (R. p. 29-30). On August 14, 2009 an Ex Parte Order was signed by a Bonneville County
Magistrate CR. p. 37). A Writ of Assistance was signed by a Salt Lake County Judge on August
17,2009 (R. p. 174), whereupon Laura returned to the marital home with the children.
Laura filed a Motion for Temporary Orders and for Possession of [the family] Residence
on August 18,2009 CR. p. 51-52). Because her initial efforts to evict Russell from the home were
unsuccessful, Laura left with the children on January 28,2010 CR. p. 166). On January 29,2010,
Laura informed Russell by email that she was leaving the state with the children and that upon
her return to Idaho, she would not return to the family home CR. p. 170). Upon returning to
Idaho, Laura and the children stayed Carmonie and Brett Russell's home in Idaho Falls
CR. p. 170). At the hearing on February 2, 2010, the Court ordered that the children return to their
home and schools in the Rigby area CR. p. 175).
After continuations and procedural delays, Laura's Motion for Temporary Orders and for
Possession of [the family] Residence was heard February 9, 2010 CR. p. 178-181) and continued
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to March 5, 2010 (R. p. 185-191). The Court entered an order March 19,2010, regarding the
Motion for Temporary Orders (R. p. 194-195). An amended order was entered by the Court
March 26, 2010 (R. p. 204-206). The Court awarded exclusive possession of the home to Laura,
along with the parties' minor children (R. p. 204). The Court further ordered Russell to vacate
the home, "on the express condition that Spencer Knight shall provide the deposit and monthly
rental, as a gift to the community, towards a 3-bedroom apartment for [Russell] in as close
proximity as possible to the community home" (R. p. 205). The Court granted parenting time to
Russell consisting of two evenings per week and every other weekend (R. p. 205).
After separating, Russell secured an RV and parked it on the lot adjacent to the family
residence with the landowner's permission. Although the lot was adjacent to a canal, the canal
was empty and safety was not a concern at the time of the placement of the RV (R. p. 387).
By April 11, 2010, sixteen days after entry of the amended order which required Russell
to vacate the family residence, Russell (at Laura's invitation) moved back into the family home.
The parties had apparently reconciled, with a full resumption of the marital relationship, intimate
and otherwise (Tr. p. 579, L. 15-22).
From August 3,2010 to August 12,2010, Laura and the two older children went to
Disneyland. In Laura's absence, a babysitter cared for the younger children during the day and
Russell cared for them on evenings and weekends (Tr. p. 441, L. 4-24).
There was no further activity in this case until the Court's Notice of Dismissal on
September 2, 2010 (R. p. 217). Laura explained the reason for the inactivity in her Motion for
Retention, entered on September 14,2010, as follows: "This Motion is brought on the grounds
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and for the reasons that the parties are still working on resolving this matter and need an
additional sixty days to complete all issues, or this matter will be set for trial" (R. p. 218).
The Court granted the parties sixty additional days, until Laura brought a Motion for
Relief from Mediation and Request for Trial Setting on November 9,2010 (R. p. 224-225). The
trial was set at that time for March 2, 2011 (R. p. 229).
Between December 25 and 31, 2011, Laura asked Russell to vacate the family residence,
stating that the Temporary Orders entered by the Court March 26, 2010, were still in effect.
Russell stated his belief that the Temporary Orders had been set aside by both parties, and
Russell therefore declined to leave the family residence as Laura had requested. Laura's request
was subsequently illustrated by her Motion to Enforce Order, entered January 5, 2011
(R. p. 231-232), which asserted that Russell needed to be removed from the home because of the
conflict that ensued from his presence, and that Will and Joseph were "beginning again to exhibit
severe signs of stress, depression and self harm" (R. p. 231).
On January 10,2011, Laura filed for a civil protection order against Russell. On her
application for this order, Laura wrote, "Please enforce temporary orders already in place."
(Tr. P. 572, L. 9-10). A temporary protection order prohibiting Russell from the family home
was initially granted. The matter came before the magistrate on January 20, 2011, where, after a
contested hearing, Laura's request for a civil protection order was dismissed. Russell thereafter
resumed his residence in the family home.
In anticipation of trial, both parties and the children participated in a full custody
evaluation by Dr. Ruby Walker. The evaluation, submitted by Dr. Walker to the Court
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February 24, 2011 (R. p. 249-257), recommended fully shared legal and physical custody ofthe
children on an approximately equal basis (R. p. 257).

IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the magistrate abuse its discretion in awarding primary physical custody to
Laura with limited visitation to Russell?

2.

Did the magistrate abuse its discretion in permitting Laura to move to Utah with
the parties' five minor children?

V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Russell hereby requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and
12-121; Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54; Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41; and any and
all other applicable rules and statutes.

VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case is on direct permissive appeal from the decision of the Magistrate Court
affecting custody of minor children. Therefore, this Court is directly reviewing the magistrate's
decision without the benefit of a district court appellate decision (See e.g., Roberts v. Roberts,
138 Idaho 401, 403,64 P.3d 327, 329 (2003)).
In custody disputes, the awarding of custody of minor children rests within the discretion
of the trial court whose decision will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion

(Koester v. Koester, 99 Idaho 654, 657,586 P.2d 1370, 1373 (1978)). In general, a trial court
does not abuse this discretion so long as it recognizes the issue as one of discretion; acts within
the outer limits of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
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available choices; and reaches its decision through an exercise of reason (Sun Valley Shopping
Center v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)). (See also Brown v.
Allen, 134 Idaho 60, 63, 995 P.2d 830,833 (2000), Osteraas v. Osteraas, 124 Idaho 350,353,
859 P.2d 948,951 (1993)).
On appeal, the magistrate's custody decision will be overturned by this Court ifit finds
that such decision is an abuse of discretion (Roberts, infra, 138 Idaho at 403,64 P.3d at 329). A
magistrate abuses its discretion when it makes a custody award based on evidence that is
insufficient to conclude that the award is in the child's best interests (Nelson v. Nelson, 144
Idaho 710, 713, 170 P.3d 375,378 (2007)).
Further, in any court decision affecting children, the best interests of the children should
be the primary consideration (Cope v. Cope, 98 Idaho 920, 921, 576 P.2d 201,202 (1978)). The
children's best interests are also of paramount importance when making decisions relating to
where the children will reside (Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 455, 80 P.3d 1049, 1056
(2003)). Findings by a magistrate pertaining to custody are relevant, so long as they bear an
appropriate nexus to the best interests of the child standard (Roeh v. Roeh, 113 Idaho 557,558,
746 P.2d 1016, 1018 (1987)). A magistrate's findings are competent, so long as they are
supported by substantial, albeit possibly conflicting evidence (Lickley v. Max Herbold, Inc., 133
Idaho 209, 211, 984 P.2d 697, 699 (1999)). Evidence is substantial "if a reasonable trier offact
would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven"
(King v. King, 137 Idaho 438, 442,50 P.3d 453, 457 (2002)). This Court is not bound by the
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legal conclusions of the magistrate, and is free to draw its own conclusions from the facts
presented (Cluffv. Bonner County, 126 Idaho 950, 952, 895 P.2d 551, 553 (1995)).

VII. ARGUMENT
A. THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY TO LAURA
WITH LIMITED VISITATION TO RUSSELL
In making a determination regarding child custody, the children's best interests are of
paramount importance (Hoskinson, infra, 139 Idaho at 455,80 P.3d at 1056)). "A court
may ... give such direction for the custody ... ofthe children of the marriage as may seem
necessary or proper in the best interests of the children" (Idaho Code §32-717).
Idaho Code §32-717(1)(a)-(g) states further:
In determining what is in the children's best interests, courts are required to
consider all relevant factors [which] may include, but are not limited to: the
parents' wishes for the children's custody; the children's wishes; the
interrelationship and interaction between the children and their parents and
siblings; the extent the children have adjusted to their school, home, and
community; the character and circumstances of the persons involved; the need to
promote continuity and stability in the children's lives; and domestic violence.
Unless one parent is a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence, the presumption in Idaho
is that joint custody is in the best interests of children. "Absent a preponderance of the evidence
to the contrary, there shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of [minor
children]" (Idaho Code §32-717B(4)). This Court has expounded "[j]oint custody means an order
awarding custody of the minor child ... to both parents and providing that physical custody shall
be shared by the parents in such a way to assure the child ... offrequent and continuing contact
with both parents" (King v. King, 137 Idaho 438,445,50 P.3d 453, 460 (2002)).
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Joint custody also requires that each parent have physical custody for significant periods
of time (Idaho Code §32-717B(2»). Specifically, "joint physical custody" means "an order
awarding each of the parents significant periods oftime in which a child resides with or is under
the care and supervision of each of the parents or parties" (Id).
A magistrate may decline to award joint custody or, as in this case, may fashion a custody
and visitation schedule that does not provide each parent significant periods of time with the
children (Idaho Code §32-717B(4). The record, however, must contain evidence overcoming the
joint custody presumption (Id, emphasis added). The court must, in addition, "state in its decision
the reasons for denial of an award of joint custody" or an award denying a parent significant
periods of time with the children (Idaho Code §32-717B(1»). In determining a visitation
schedule, magistrates should attempt to "provide a satisfactory basis for preserving and fostering
the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent" (Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 929, 940, 204
P.3d 1140, 1151 (2009).
In this case, the magistrate awarded Laura primary physical custody with visitation to
Russell of every other weekend, sharing holidays, and rotating two week periods of time during
the summer (R. p. 405-406). The visitation ordered in the Divorce Decree was less visitation than
Russell was granted in the Temporary Orders, which consisted of two evenings during each
week and every other weekend. (R. p. 205). The Temporary Orders were not ordered until nearly
a year after the divorce had been filed (R. p. 205) and were only briefly followed by the parties
since Russell was only out of the parties' home less than a month before Laura invited him back
into the home (Tr. p., 34-35, L. 1-7; p. 175-176; p. 384, L. 6-13). During the majority of the
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divorce proceeding, the parties lived together, with the children, by oral agreement between the
parties until the Court's Order on Permissive Appeal.
The magistrate granted the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of the children. It
would seem that a parenting plan would have been fashioned by the magistrate which provided
for each parent to spend significant periods of time with the children. Instead, the magistrate
granted primary physical custody to Laura along with the majority of the time with the children.
The magistrate granted Russell only two overnights with the children out of every fourteen days,
with no provision for any contact whatsoever during noncustodial time. Such a decision is
contrary to the legal presumption of joint legal custody as provided statutorily and as interpreted
by this Court. The decision contradicted Dr. Walker's recommendations in her custody
evaluation and the weight of evidence that the children need frequent and regular contact with
Russell. The magistrate's decision gave undue weight and consideration to Laura's arguments.

1. The Magistrate Largely Ignored Dr. Walker's Comprehensive Custody Evaluation
The magistrate ordered a custody evaluation (R. p. 175; Tr. p. 3, L. 4.:.15) and Dr. Ruby
Walker was assigned to conduct the evaluation (R. p. 175; Tr. p. 3, L. 4-15). Dr. Walker
submitted her findings to the magistrate on February 24,2011 (R. p. 249) and her report was
admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 at trial (Tr. p. 3, L. 4-15). The magistrate disregarded Dr.
Walker's recommendations of joint physical custody with a parenting plan allowing the children
equal time with both parents.
The magistrate mentioned Dr. Walker's report merely four times in his Memorandum
Decision. He reviewed: 1) Dr. Walker's report pertaining to the children's wishes to remain in
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Idaho CR. p. 386); 2) the report's reference to the children's attachment to Laura CR. p. 386);
3) the report's reference to Russell's activity with the children CR. p. 387); and 4) Russell's
agreement to the report's recitation of Laura's strengths CR. p. 388). No other mention was made
of Dr. Walker's opinion or her recommended parenting plan.
The custody evaluation was thorough and comprehensive. It included numerous
observations and interviews between the parties and children as evidenced by Dr. Walker's
report and outlined as follows:
DATES AND PURPOSES OF CLINICAL CONTACTS (R. p. 250)

111112011
1/26/2011
1112/2011
1112/2011
1112/2011
1127/2011
1127/2011

Initial interview of Laura
Initial interview of Russell
Initial interview ofE. P., W. P., T. P., 1. P., and G. P.
Second interview of Laura
Joint interview with Laura, E. P., W. P., T. P., 1. P., and G. P.
Second interview of Russell
Joint interview with Russell, E. P., W. P., T. P., 1. P., and G. P.

Additional information, including documentation, testing, and collateral contact
interviews were considered by Dr. Walker as follows:
Parents' family history, parents' personal history, parent's interviews, Interview
for Joint Custody, individual interviews with the children, interview with each
parent and the children, interactive sessions with each parent and the children,
telephone interviews with friends, relatives, colleagues, Parenting Stress Index,
children's grades and attendance records, Incident/Investigation Report OCA
2009-07319, protection order, Case Number CV-2011-0000020 01110111,
dismissal of CPO, letter from counselor, letter from clinical psychologist, letter
from Mental Wellness Center, letters of support for Russell Peterson, and assorted
court documents concerning the case CR. p. 250).
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2. The Magistrate Failed To Consider Dr. Walker's Evidence
Regarding Russell's Strengths
Dr. Walker's report noted numerous positive, confirming findings that Russell is a good,
involved father, which were not mentioned in the magistrate's findings and decision. For
example, she reported that:
[H]e is actively involved in his children's lives and has cared for them with his
wife, Laura, and on his own; that Russell has many collateral contacts that can
verify what a good father he is. [They] rate Russell as a good father. He is kind
and patient and a very credible person. They describe Russell as the person who
takes the children camping and does outdoor experiences that will benefit the
children for life. [He] is the most caring, kind and responsible Dad they've seen.
[He] is very protective of the children and maintain that he would never put the
children in a compromising situation (R. p. 252, 253).
Russell was also very patient and kind with the children. He also was observant of
all five children and rotated to be attentive to all of them. Russell speaks openly to
the children and they are responsive to his suggestions and comments. He
exhibited good parenting techniques in the interactive session. If he made a
boundary, he was attentive to follow up as necessary. The children were anxious
to show him items they were playing with and wanted him to 'watch.' The
children are bonded and attached to Russell. He made good boundaries and upon
the request to clean up so they could leave, the children were compliant.
(R. p. 253).

3. Dr. Walker Also Produced Evidence Which Candidly
Considered Russell's Weaknesses
Dr. Walker thoroughly reviewed Russell's struggle with same sex attraction, including
the facts surrounding his arrest in June of2009 which Laura was so concerned about. Dr. Walker
specifically noted that she reviewed the "Incident/Investigation Report, OCA 2009-07319,"
which was the police report of Russell's arrest (R. p. 278). She noted further that she was aware
that "Russell was charged with being a 'public nuisance' and for 'indecent exposure' in 2009.
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He bonded out of jail and appeared before the judge and pled guilty to 'public nuisance' and the
'indecent exposure' was dismissed" (R. p. 279). In the custody evaluation process, Dr. Walker
reported that she discussed this issue with both parents. Her report is replete with references to
this issue as it pertained to the best interests of the children. Her conclusion regarding the issue
and its impact on her ultimate recommendation is reported as follows:
It is important to note that the courts cannot punish one parent because she/he has
a same-sex preference. However, the parent must not allow circumstances to
occur that would bring social judgment and/or discrimination on the children. In
this particular case, it is not known whether Elise and Will know about the
incident affecting their father, Russell.
Collateral contacts have verified that Russell has not put the children in a
compromised situation and is a good father, seeing to their every need (R. p. 256).
It is abundantly clear that Dr. Walker knew of Russell's same sex attraction issue,
she thoroughly reviewed its implications on the parents and the children, and she took it
into consideration when making her recommendation.

4. Dr. Walker Made Custody Recommendations The Magistrate
Failed To Consider And Mention
At the conclusion of her report, Dr. Walker recommended:
... joint legal and physical custody of the children. Laura has left Russell to care
for the children and she occasionally takes one or two of the children with her and
leaves the others with Russell. The parents have set a precedent in one or the other
caring for the children. The children are very comfortable with both parents
(R. p. 256, 257).
Most importantly, Dr. Walker concluded in her custody evaluation that:
[t]he children are bonded and attached to Russell," and that, "[t]he children have
been raised by both parents actively involved in their care. To change this in any
drastic manner will have a detrimental effect upon the children (R. p. 253, 256).
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5. The Magistrate Failed To Consider Dr. Walker's Proposed Parenting Plan
Supportive of joint physical custody of the children, Dr. Walker emphasized that, "this
family can do joint custody" (R. p. 255). Dr. Walker then outlined in detail her specific
recommendations for the parenting plan:
Russell presently works Monday through Friday 8 a.m. to 5 or 6 p.m. This does
not give much time during the week to have parenting time. However, the
children could spend the night with Russell and he could take them to school and
return the twins to Laura or take them to daycare as the parents arrange. The
children have spent enough time with both parents that the consecutive night
visitations for the 3-year-old twins should not be problematic. I recommend the
parents pick two nights during the week for the children to spend the night with
Russell plus alternate weekends from Friday until he takes them to school on
Monday morning (R. p. 257).
Dr. Walker further recommended alternating holidays and special days. Dr. Walker's
objective clearly specified equal and shared physical custody between the parents, which would
enable the children to spend time with both parents on a frequent and consistent basis.
Russell recognizes that divorce will separate the children from both parents, as the parties
will live in separate homes. Russell believes such separation between children and parents should
be as minimal as possible and that the Divorce Decree should promote frequent and regular
contact with both parents, in accordance with Dr. Walker's recommendations. Russell has
established bonds and relationships with his children which are, in his words, "relationships that
have started at birth and they have continued every single day. I have not been uninvolved at all.
I have made it a point to be involved every day ... " (Tr. p., 560, L. 22-25).
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Russell does not argue that a magistrate must adopt the findings and recommendations of
a court-appointed custody evaluator as a matter of law. However, the magistrate must give
consideration to the evaluator's findings, especially when a comprehensive evaluation was
provided and, as in this case, when no contradicting expert testimony is proffered against the
evaluator's report. The only evidence Laura submitted to counter Dr. Walker's evaluation and
Russell's evidence was Laura's testimony. Thus, if a magistrate rules against an evaluation, it
should be required of him to explain his findings and conclusions in support of his decision to do
so. In this case, not only did the magistrate fail to explain his finding and conclusions, he failed
to materially address the custody evaluation and its recommendations.

6. Substantial Evidence Was Produced That Russell Is A Good Father
Consistently Involved With The Children
The trial in this case produced overwhelming evidence that Russell is a very good and
loving father who actively participates in the care and upbringing of his five minor children.

(See, e.g., Tr. p., 53, L. 14-17; p. 59, L. 3-7; p. 177, L. 12-22; p. 559, L. 3-25; p. 560, L. 3-25 and
R. p. 249-257). Russell testified that he has been active on a daily basis caring for the children.
(Tr. p., 53, L. 14-17). Russell has taken the children on camping trips and has spent a lot of time
with his children in the outdoors. (R. p. 256). On the days Russell works, he is active upon his
return home in doing things such as nightly devotionals with the children, reading with them,
praying with them, and tucking them into bed (Tr. p. 177, L. 12-22). Russell helps get the
children ready and takes them to church each Sunday (R. p. 252). At times when his children
have been sick, Russell gets up with them, comforts them, and rocks them back to sleep
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(R. p. 252). Russell is a caring, kind, and responsible father (R. p. 253). An example of his
extraordinary devotion to his children comes by way of the evidence that he took paternity leave
from his employment when his three youngest children were born (Tr. p. 560, L. 17-24).
At trial, Russell testified in detail about his consistent involvement with the children:
I will get home from work each day and have the children run to me and give me
a hug, if not knock me over, telling me that they're glad to see me. I'll spend the
evening with them jumping on the trampoline in the summer. I will often be
working with them in the garden. I will be doing wood with them in the winter,
teaching them how to work. I'll be playing with them and I have always tucked
them into bed, telling the boys especially, stories that were made up about
everything from a boy and his pet dinosaur to prince and dragons, just stories that
they would ask for and like every night, you know, unless there was extenuating
circumstances (Tr. p. 559, L. 3-15).
When asked if he had this routine regularly with his children, Russell replied, "since they
were born" (Tr. p. 559, L. 18). Laura was even asked, "Russ has always been a part of the
children's lives on a consistent basis, hasn't he?" (Tr. p. 501, L. 18-20). Laura's answer, "Yes."
(Tr. p. 501, L. 21).
And yet the magistrate limited his findings regarding Russell's involvement in the
children's lives. The sum total of his relevant findings consisted ofthe following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Russell does more camping and outdoor activities and Thane loves to go with him
and do activities with him (R. p. 287).
Russell interacts with the children when he is at home and on the weekends. He
did take one month off when the twins were born (R. p. 287).
Russell has struggled with a same-sex attraction since prior to the parties'
marriage (R. p. 287).
Laura has, on occasion, left some of the children with Russell when she has gone
out oftown for a week or so (R. p. 389).
Russell reads scriptures, has a song and says prayers with the children each
evening (R. p. 389).
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The magistrate abused its discretion by limiting his relevant findings about Russell to the
references cited above, especially in the face of overwhelming evidence established at trial.

7. Insufficient Evidence Was Produced By Laura To Prevail Over The Evidence
In Favor Of Joint Legal Custody And Equal Division Of Time
Compared with the lack of favorable findings the magistrate made regarding Russell, the
magistrate mentioned numerous positive findings regarding Laura. These findings are
insufficient to rebut the overwhelming evidence in support of Dr. Walker's recommendations.
The magistrate's Memorandum Decision is replete with findings in favor of Laura which
Russell did not contest: the emotional attachment is strong with the children and their mother (R.
p. 386); Laura is the primary caregiver in terms of time with the children CR. p. 287); Laura's
strengths as a mother are: she is willing to stay home with the children, is often very caring and
warm to the children, and overall she has been a good mother CR. p. 388). A review of pages 386
through 390 of the Clerk's Record referenced in the magistrate's Memorandum Decision
illustrates the focus on Laura's strengths and version of the facts which support her request as
opposed to the minute mention of Russell's strengths, Russell's testimony, and Dr. Walker's
evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations.
The magistrate also made findings personal to Laura as an individual: she feels
humiliated by the August, 2009, arrest of Russell related to his same-sex attraction issues
CR. p. 389); Laura exaggerated the truth over the years CR. p. 387); and Laura struggled with
overeating, some depression, and trichotillomania (R. p. 387). These findings are scant and little
weight was given to Laura's personal issues, especially her exaggeration of the truth. In making
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the decision he did, the magistrate essentially ignored the overwhelming evidence Russell and
Dr. Walker provided and adopted wholesale Laura's version of the facts by substantially granting
Laura's request for custody and visitation.

8. Laura's Evidence Contradicting Dr. Walker's
Evaluation Was Wholly Insufficient
During trial Laura was specifically asked to explain her disagreement with Dr. Walker's
evaluation and, specifically, the parenting plan recommended therein, as follows:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Q:
A:

Do you feel that that type of a schedule is in the best interests of your
children?
No, I don't.
Can you tell the Court why not?
First and foremost is we've never done that before in our lives. They are in
their beds. We don't even let them sleep out of their own beds, let alone
out of the house.
Is that all of the children?
All of them, to my knowledge. Ifit happens, it happens without my
knowledge or rarely. Consistency through the week has been - during the
school week has been primary, has been absolutely enforced in our
household. I know how important that is ... Children need stability and
consistency and I respectfully disagree with this [Dr. Walker's]
recommendation because that is not what we even do in our home. I
wouldn't my conscience wouldn't even allow that. [The twins] are not
to go back and forth overnight like that would be problematic. They come
and find me in the morning and I think that would honestly, that would
be traumatic for them. That's my own feeling (Tr. p. 405, L. 1-19; p. 405,
L. 25; P. 406, L. 1-13).

Laura reasoned that she couldn't share custody because she had "never done that before."
She was asked to further explain whether she believed she could do shared physical custody as
recommended by Dr. Walker:

26

Q:

A:
Q:
A:

Do you feel that the two of you can effectively co-parent your children,
communicate and co-parent your children as outlined per [Dr. Walker's]
evaluation ... ?
No.
And why not?
Well, you'd have to be able to talk, first of all, and not argue .... He does
not respect me, I do not respect him. There is nothing there except for it's just - just misery (Tr. p. 414, L. 6-18).

These statements in Laura's testimony represent her specific concerns regarding Dr.
Walker's evaluation, report and recommendations. Laura's testimony is wholly insufficient in its
totality to support a finding contrary to Dr. Walker's proposed parenting plan.
Additionally, the magistrate asked Laura (regarding a second opinion custody
evaluation), "[D]o you want additional time to have your own study done?" (Tr. p. 21, L. 10-11).
On Laura's behalf, her counsel declined, "We don't, Your Honor," (Tr. p. 21, L. 12).
9. The Court Made Improper Idaho Code §32-717(g) Character Findings
Russell disclosed to Laura's father information regarding Laura's past sexual abuse by
one of her brothers when she was a young girl (R. p. 387). In his finding, the magistrate
explained, "[Laura] shared this information with [Russell] in confidence, and he then, without
the knowledge of and without authorization, disclosed this information to [Laura's] father. [Her]
father had not previously been aware of this" (R. p. 387-388). The relevance of this information
to a custody decision is questionable, but the magistrate made it part of his analysis and findings
under Idaho Code §32-717(e).
The magistrate did not mention Russell's testimony at trial which explained why he had
disclosed Laura's abuse to her father. Russell explained that he never considered telling anyone
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about the abuse until Laura became intent on moving to Utah where her family resided
(Tr. p., 267). When asked why he disclosed this information, Russell testified:
A:

Q:
A:

Because no one in Laura's family has seen the effects of that abuse on my family
every day for the last 17 years. We have dealt with it, whether it's anxiety,
whether it's not letting the children go places because she fears something would
happen to them, whether it's her explaining to me that her eating disorder had its
genesis in this abuse and that obesity is common among victims of sexual abuse
as a means to forestall the physical intimacy that would otherwise be a part of
marriage, everything.
Okay. You had not talked to him previously about this, correct?
No. 1'd always honored her confidence until she was trying to move the children
down closer to this toxic influence that's never been dealt with.
(Tr. p. 257, L. 1-15).

Russell clearly felt that he was justified in taking this issue to Laura's father during the
divorce litigation, especially when Laura's wishes were to move to be with her family. Laura's
father, Ronald Knight, minimized the abuse in his testimony at trial when he stated, ',[Russell
gave me a file] and mentioned a little abuse when she was a child by her brother, which I didn't
see any application to the issues from that.. .. " (Tr. p, 118, L. 11-15). The magistrate clearly
weighed this disclosure against Russell, erroneously.
Another example ofthe magistrate's erroneous findings is the reference the magistrate
made, under Idaho Code §32-717(g), regarding the copies that Russell made of his daughter,
E. P. 's, journal (R. p. 388). The magistrate made an undisputed finding that in August or

September of2009, after the filing of the divorce and Laura's attempt to move the children to
Utah without Russell's knowledge, Russell read and copied a portion ofE. P.'sjournal. The
magistrate noted, "[t]his was done without the authorization or the prior knowledge ofE. P."
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(R. p. 388). The magistrate correctly noted that Russell later told E. P. about what he had done

and that E. P. had not kept a journal since (R. p. 388).
Russell was questioned extensively at trial about this matter. In reply, Russell explained
in detail why he had read and copied E. P.'s journal:
Because to the extent to which I've copied any journal has been the extent to
which ... many of these issues are not...forthrightly disclosed to me and this is an
important source of information about how [E. P.] is dealing with this, her
thoughts that have been misrepresented to this Court and in other venues .... Elise
is ... very private and so she doesn't volunteer information, and given the
magnitude of her turmoil over this as disclosed in her journals, yes, I thought that
was very appropriate and needful for me as her parent to have some insight into
what was going on" (Tr. p. 275, L. 1-8 and L. 18-23).
Russell testified that he learned in July, 2009, that Laura was considering a move to Utah
with the children, without discussing her intentions with Russell. One way he learned of this plan
was by reading E. P.'s journal (Tr. p. 278-279). Russell believed that E. P. did not want to move
to Utah, which fact was confirmed by reading her journal (Tr. p. 280, L. 7-19).
Russell was asked if reading E. P.' s journal helped him to better understand E. P. and
help her deal with some of her struggles given the conflicts between Russell and Laura on the
issue of the Utah move. Russell replied, "[a]bsolutely" (Tr. p. 276, L. 1-4). The magistrate might
have construed Russell's concern as evidence of an involved and concerned father; however, he
instead found that '[t]he impact upon E. P. of [Russell's] violation of her privacy in relation to
her journal is of concern to the court" (R. p. 388, emphasis added).
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B. THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING
LAURA TO MOVE THE CHILDREN TO UTAH

In cases where a parent wishes to relocate with the children in a divorce or post-divorce
setting, this Court has previously held:
[I]n any judicial determination regarding the custody of children, including where
they reside, the best interests of the child should be the standard and primary
consideration. In addition, Idaho favors the active participation of both parents in
raising children after divorce, which policy is reflected in I.C. §32-717B
supporting joint custody. For these reasons, in Idaho, the moving parent has the
burden of proving relocation would be in the best interests of the child
(Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 405, 64 P.3d 327,331 (2003)).
The public policy as it relates to relocation as set forth by the Roberts decision has
subsequently been a topic of much discussion in subsequent relocation cases this Court has
decided. The practical considerations of relocation were vividly outlined by then Chief Justice
Eismann in Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449,197 P.3d 310 (2008), where in concurring with the
majority's result, but not the opinion, Chief Justice Eismann observed that in order for [joint
custody] to occur, "the child will have to be living in physical proximity to both parents"
(Id. at 325, 464). Chief Justice Eismann stated further:

[P]ermitting a parent to move away with a child still typically prevents the other
parent from having frequent physical custody of the child. Obviously, ifthere is a
presumption in favor of joint custody, then there is a presumption against
allowing one parent to move away with the child if the move would prevent the
other parent from having frequent and continuing physical custody of the child.
To hold otherwise would render the statutory presumption meaningless
(Id. at 325, 464).
Chief Justice Eismann elaborated:
To overcome that presumption, the parent wishing to move away with the child
must prove that it is in the child's best interests for the other parent not to have
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frequent and continuing custody of the child .... The parent should not ... be
permitted to move away with the child simply because the moving parent
concludes that other things in his or her life are more important than the other
parent's ability to maintain a relationship with the child (Id. at 325-326, 464-465).
In cases subsequent to Roberts, this Court has guarded against parental actions that would
interfere with the relationship between a parent and child. For example, in Weiland v. Ruppel,
(139 Idaho 122, 75 P.3d 176 (2003)), the trial court's decision that refused a mother's request to
move to Oregon with the parties' child was upheld by this Court. The trial court concluded that
the move would have an adverse impact on the child's relationship with his father, who resided
in Idaho. In doing so the trial court emphasized Idaho Code §32-717(A)(3): the interaction and
interrelationship ofthe child with his or her parents. The trial court concluded that "the adverse
impact upon [the child's] relationship with his father will outweigh any potential benefits he
might receive by virtue of his mother's relocation to Portland" (Id. at 125, 179).
As it pertains to this case, the analysis by the trial court in Weiland is familiar. The trial
court found that, "[ c]learly, [the child] is primarily attached or bonded with his mother and she
has been his primary caretaker since birth" (Id. at 124, 178). These same findings were made by
the magistrate in the case at bar regarding Laura. The trial court in Weiland also found that,
"[t]he evidence is clear that it would be in [the child's] best interests for her to continue in the
role as primary caretaker" (Id). The trial court in Weiland, unlike the magistrate in this case, was
persuaded after a review ofthe custody evaluator's report and agreed with the evaluator that:
(The child] is also bonded and attached with his father, albeit perhaps to a lesser
extent, and obtains additional benefits from that relationship which differ from
that his mother provides. [The child] will clearly benefit from continuing to have
frequent and continuous contact with his father, especially at this age and the few
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years which follow while he is going through his early developmental stages"
(Jd).
In Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 167 P.3d 761 (2007), a mother had secreted the
child and moved with the parties' five-month-old child to Montana. The trial court pern1itted the
mother to remain in Montana with the child and eventually awarded her primary physical
custody. This Court vacated the trial court's ruling, stating:
The mother should have been ordered to return the child to Idaho where the father
might exercise his rights as an equal parent and have this case decided with the
underlying legal and social principle that it is in the best interests of a child to
have a continuing relationship with both parents. (Id. at 627, 764).
Chief Justice Eismann went on to review this Court's decision in Thurman v. Thurman,
(73 Idaho 122,245 P.2d 810 (1952)), where this Court reversed an order changing custody to a
parent who had alienated the children from the mother. This Court's decision in Thurman
emphasized that:
The best welfare of minor children is promoted by having such children respect
and love both parents. This is natural and every effort should be directed to the
end that such respect and affection will not be destroyed and alienated; any other
course is not in the interest of and for the best welfare of such minor children ....
The acts and conduct of the custodial parent, resulting in the alienation of the love
and affection which children naturally have for the other parent, is a vital and very
serious detrimentto the welfare of such children .... (Id. at 128, 814).
The very purpose of the presumption in Idaho Code §32-717B is to assure that both
parents have the opportunity to have frequent and continual physical custody of their children for
significant periods of time (emphasis added). As Justice Eismann pointed out:

One parent should not be able to interfere with that relationship by ... [alienating
the children from the other parent] ... or moving away with the child ifit would
prevent the other parent from having frequent and continuing physical custody of
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the child. In any of those circumstances, the result is the same. One parent is
acting contrary to the best interests of the child by preventing the child from
developing and having a healthy relationship with the other parent" Bartosz v.
Jones, 146 Idaho at 465, 197 P.3d at 326).
In order for a parent to move the children, he or she must rebut the presumption in favor
of joint custody. Stated differently, the moving parent must rebut the presumption in favor of the
nonmoving parent having frequent and continuing physical custody of the children or the moving
parent must rebut the presumption in favor of having the children develop and have a healthy
relationship with the other parent. The magistrate's finding did not support a rebuttal of this
presumption. The magistrate ignored the custody evaluation which recommended against
moving the children and made false findings of fact to support his decision to permit Laura to
move the children. Laura's evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption; she provided
evidence in support of keeping the children in close proximity to both parents.
1. The Court Ignored The Custody Evaluator's Recommendation
Against Laura Moving The Children
Regarding Laura's proposed move ofthe children to Utah, Dr. Walker made the
following findings which militated against such a move:

1.

2.
3.
4.

The children have been raised with both parents actively involved in their
care. To change this in any drastic manner will have a detrimental effect
upon the children.
The children like to go to Utah but prefer to remain in their current schools
with friends, their church, and activities in the Rigby area.
Russell is the primary provider for the family. For him to move and secure
employment in another area could be problematic.
Laura would eventually like to go back to school so she can help provide
for the family. She is close to two universities where she could continue
her education (R. p. 256).
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Dr. Walker recommended a parenting plan with both parents in close proximity of the
children and sharing equally in the parenting time with the children (R. p. 257). The magistrate
ignored Dr. Walker's findings in deciding to permit Laura to move the children to Utah.

2. The Children Did Not Want To Move To Utah
Dr. Walker interviewed the children on at least three different occasions (R. p. 250).
Obviously, Dr. Walker discussed the proposed move with the children in what was undisputedly
a neutral setting and without pressure from either parent. The children were interviewed in a
setting where each parent brought them separately and on different dates to visit Dr. Walker. Had
Dr. Walker reported that the children on different dates voiced different desires regarding the
proposed move to Utah, it could be argued that each parent was attempting to influence the
children's statements to Dr. Walker. This was not what Dr. Walker reported.
Dr. Walker reported no conflict or dispute in the children's opposition to moving to Utah.
The children's preference, according to Dr. Walker, was clear for a number of reasons: their
desire to remain in their current schools, to maintain current friendships, attend their current
church, and continue their participation in activities in the Rigby area.
Russell testified that his discussions with the children, especially the two oldest,
confirmed Dr. Walker's report that neither wanted to move to Utah (Tr. p., 274-276). By reading
E. P.'s journal, Russell confirmed that E. P. did not want to move to Utah (Tr. p. 280).
As evidence of the children's desire to move to Utah, Laura offered a total of five words
to counter Dr. Walker's findings and Russell's testimony:
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Q:

A:
Q:

A:

[Dr. Walker's report] says [the children] want to remain in their current
schools, but they like to go to Utah, but they prefer to remain in their
current schools, church, friends, etc., here?
My daughter feels differently (Tr. p. 447, L. 7-11, emphasis added).
Has there ever been occasion since [Dr. Walker's report] came out that
you have heard the children say anything different than what is in that
report?
Yes (Tr. p. 613, L. 25; p. 614, L. 1-3, emphasis added).

In the Memorandum Decision, the magistrate discussed Dr. Walker's findings regarding
the wishes of the children and Russell's testimony in support of Dr. Walker's findings. However,
Laura's five words providing contrary evidence were seemingly more persuasive to the
magistrate regarding the wishes of the children. He stated, "The court did not hear from the
children directly. The court is unclear regarding the children's wishes" (R. p. 386).
In making a finding of what is in the children's best interests, the wishes of the children
are a factor the magistrate is to consider, pursuant to Idaho Code §32-7I7(1 )(b). The wishes of
the children are a significant factor as a child becomes older and is able to voice his or he desire
in an intelligent and mature fashion. At the time oftrial, E. P. was fourteen years old and W. P.
was twelve years old. Customarily, at this age, children are able to express their wishes in a
custody case in a fashion the magistrate can and should consider.
Although E. P. and W. P. expressed their desires most credibly to Dr. Walker in a neutral
forum, the magistrate nevertheless found that, "[t]he court is unclear regarding the children's
wishes." (R. p. 386). Such a finding was an abuse of discretion. If Laura truly believed the
children did not want to go to Utah, it was her duty and opportunity to obtain a second custody
evaluation or other expert opinion to present to the magistrate in support of her belief.
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3. Any Drastic Change Is Detrimental To The Children
The magistrate made a specific finding regarding Idaho Code §32-717(1)(d) and the
children's adjustment to their home, school, and community. The magistrate found, "[t]he
children are well adjusted to their home, school and community" (R. p. 387). Regarding
Idaho Code §32-7l7(1)(f) and the need to promote continuity and stability in the lives of the
children, the magistrate found that the children had lived in southeast Idaho since 1999, and the
majority of the time since 2004 in the family home in Rigby (R. p. 389).
Russell's testimony supported these findings. He testified that, "[o]ur children are very
well and firmly and successfully integrated into their church and community" (Tr. p. 65:5-7).
Russell further testified in detail regarding the children's friends, social activities, and church
involvement (Tr. p. 65). Laura also confirmed that the children were active and well-adjusted to
their community (Tr. p. 399). Both parents took an active role in raising the children.
Dr. Walker considered all ofthese facts. She specifically found that, "[t]he children have
been raised with both parents actively involved in their care" (R. p. 256). Considering all of this,
Dr. Walker concluded that, "[tJo change this in any drastic manner will have a detrimental effect
upon the children" (R. p. 256, emphasis added).
Without mentioning Dr. Walker's findings and report, the magistrate specifically made
findings on the impact moving the children would have on the children's relationship with the
non-custodial parent, or said another way, the impact such a "change in a drastic manner," in the
words of Dr. Walker, would have upon the children. He found:
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A move to Utah would reduce the amount of time that the children would have
with a parent who did not move to Utah inasmuch as the children have been
residing in the same horne with both parents during the recent pendency of this
divorce action. At the conclusion of this divorce action, the parents will not be
residing in the same residence. Accordingly, the time spent by one or both of the
parents with the children will, of necessity, be reduced. A non-relocating parent
could still have the children with him/her on weekends, holidays, on other
important days and during summers CR. p. 390).
The magistrate reasoned that, because of the divorce, "time spent with one or both of the
parents with the children will, of necessity, be reduced." He infers that a move to Utah is
justified as a result. This circular logic cannot reasonably rebut the strong presumption in favor
of the other parent having frequent and continuing physical custody of the children as set forth in
Idaho Code §32-717B and Roberts. The findings do not rebut the strong presumption in favor of
the interaction and interrelationship between a child and the non-custodial parent, even when the
custodial parent has primary physical custody as set forth in Weiland. Nor do the magistrate's
findings rebut the presumption that for joint custody to occur, the children need to live in close
proximity to both parents as set forth in Bartosz.
What the magistrate seems to be saying is that these are parents who lived together
during the pendency of a two year divorce case, where they both had nearly daily access to the
children and participated equally in raising the children during this time, if not the children's
entire lives. But, as unfortunate as it is, the magistrate explains that the reality of divorce is that
both parents will no longer live with the children. The result is that by necessity, one or both of
the parents will lose time with the children. Given that, reasoned the magistrate, Laura can take
the children to Utah if she chooses.
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The magistrate's decision was a very drastic change for the children when compared to
having both parents in the home as was the case for their entire lives until the divorce was
granted. But it was also a very drastic change from what Dr. Walker had recommended as a
parenting plan in her evaluation and which the magistrate ignored on this issue.
The magistrate did not make findings to explain how such a drastic change would not
detrimentally affect the children, as Dr. Walker noted. The magistrate did not make sufficient
findings explaining how Laura had rebutted the presumption in favor of joint custody and what
joint custody means in light of clear legal precedent. The magistrate's failures in this regard call
to mind this Court's decision in Allbright v. Allbright, 147 Idaho 752, 215 P.3d 472 (2009), and
the admonition given to all magistrates faced with decisions similar to that of the magistrate in
this case: "A court presiding over a child custody matter does not become a family czar with
unlimited authority to order the parents to do anything that the court believes is in the best
interests of the child" Id. at 755, 475.
There was not sufficient evidence to counter Dr. Walker's recommendation against the
children's move to Utah. The magistrate failed to explain its findings to the contrary and how
Laura met her burden of proof to rebut the presumption in favor of joint physical custody.

4. The Magistrate Made False Findings Of Fact Which
Were Material To His Decision
In his Memorandum Decision, the magistrate made findings which appear to be based
upon statements made by Laura at trial but are contradicted by Russell in his testimony or are

38

utterly unsupported by any other facts. This is most troubling as the magistrate made his decision
to allow Laura to move the children to Utah based upon many ofthese findings.

5. The Children Do Have Friends and Are Active Socially
Laura offered testimony about the children and their social activities, drawing a
distinction between life before Russell's arrest in June, 2009, and after. (Tr. p. 399-401). Laura
testified that the children did not have friends come over often (Tr. p. 399:15-16). Specifically,
she testified that since June, 2009, W. P. had not been invited to one birthday party
(Tr. p. 400:11-12). When was asked by her own counsel whether W. P. had many friends over
before the arrest, she replied, "[a]t school he seems to be doing okay there with just the general
situation, but as far as having kids over, no" (Tr. p. 401:5-9).
In this regard, the magistrate found, "[t]he children don't have friends come over often.
Since [Russell's] arrest, W. P. has not been invited to any birthday parties and he has been
distressed about this" (R. p. 389). He further found that, "[W. P.] is doing 'o.k.' in school. The
two older children are straight 'A' students" (R. p. 389). The picture the magistrate focused on
was the one Laura attempted to paint: that the children were suffering socially and with their
peers as a result of Russell's arrest. Laura's allegations were simply not supported and were
actually contradicted by overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
In her report, Dr. Walker specifically reviewed that, "there were allegations made by
Laura that the children were struggling and T. P. had a seizure due to the stress of the divorce"
(R. p. 254). Dr. Walker found no evidence to support Laura's allegations. Moreover, unlike the

magistrate, Dr. Walker actually reviewed the school records and reported that the older two
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children, E. P. and W. P., were straight "A" students and that T. P. was perforn1ing very well as a
kindergarten student (R. p. 255). This was not consistent with the magistrate's findings. Dr.
Walker also found that all the children had very few absences according to those school records
(R. p. 255).
As to the children's activities, Laura herself testified that:
Right now we have our son in a basketball, a little sports team. Our daughter, we
put her on the track team - well, she wanted to be on the track team. They have
church activities, Tuesday night scouts, and Young Women's and I have a little
preschool for the twins (Tr. p. 399:9-14).
Russell was asked about Laura's testimony regarding her concerns about the effect of the
arrest on the children:
Q: I think one of the things she testified about was her belief that the children, if
not your family, had been ostracized from friends, people at church ... Do you
agree that this has happened as a result ofthe events of June 2009?
A: Not at all.
Q: And what is the basis for your opinion in that regard?
A: My basis for my opinion is my observation of neighbor children, Cody Kilpack
at our place, our children asking and going over to the neighbor's. [W. P.] plays a
lot with his best friend, [R. P.]. [E. P.] has been asked to babysit multiple times.
Just this last Saturday I had been asked as one of the parents to go with the scouts
on an overnight trip. While I was there, I observed [W. P.] and his friends who
were in the next tent over laughing, giggling, carrying on until midnight when
they had to finally be ordered to settle down. I've been specifically invited on
other of[W. P.]'s campouts that I have been going on. I've been invited to go up
to the girl's camp by our next-door neighbor that's going to be the coming week,
and none of these invitations would come if people were even generally aware of
what happened two years ago, but there's only one person who's made this thing
two years ago the center of her existence and that's Mrs. Peterson
(Tr. p. 561:3-25; 562:1-8).
The false findings of fact regarding the children's social lives and community life came from one
source: Laura. These findings were not supported in any way by Dr. Walker who noted Laura's
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allegations in her report. Nor were the findings justified, given the specific testimony Russell
provided to the contrary. The magistrate's findings constituted an abuse of discretion as these
findings were critical factors upon which he based his decision to allow the children to move to
Utah.

6. Laura Never Resided In Utah In 2002 Such To Support A Finding That
The Parties Had Conducted Exchanges In Malad Before
The magistrate made two references in his Memorandum Decision to the parties'
exchanges in Malad, Idaho, when Laura was in Utah during their prior divorce proceeding in
2002 and which was later dismissed upon the parties' reconciliation. Specifically, he noted:
a.

Divorce proceedings were previously filed between the parties in 2002 and
later dismissed. During the parties' separation in 2002-2003, they
exchanged the children, for visitation purposes, in Malad, Idaho (R. p.
289).

b.

[T]he parties have previously worked out visitation arrangements during
their earlier (2002-2003) divorce proceedings wherein they exchanged the
children in Malad, Idaho (at Burger King) (R. p. 290) .

. These references are critical, given that they were referenced in the Memorandum
Decision wherein the magistrate discussed the impact of relocation and its impact on the
children's relationship with the non-custodial parent. The magistrate implied that any impact
would be no different or greater than the impact in 2002 when Laura was in Utah and the
children were exchanged in Malad.
The fact is that Laura never resided in Utah during the parties' divorce proceeding in
2002 (Tr. p. 398-499). Laura visited Utah a few times during that period and the parties
exchanged the children in Malad during those times. She was asked about this specifically:
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Q: And the consistency and stability of every other weekend on the road to Utah
isn't something that has been practiced in your home to this point?
A: We did it eight years ago (Tr. p. 495:2-5; 15).
Q: And did you do that. .. on an every other weekend basis?
A: I don't remember. I remember going to the Burger King at Malad and
switching kids.
Q: And as you testify about 2002 or 2003 in terms of meeting at the Burger King,
you never lived in Utah let's be clear so the Judge doesn't misunderstand thisyou didn't ever live in Utah and commute those kids up here to Idaho, did you?
A: Well, they did on the weekends we'd visit.
Q: That was over a Christmas holiday; wasn't it, and you brought them up to see
Russ?
A: Ijust remember exchanging a few times, you know, I don't remember exactly
the details.
Q: Did you live in Utah?
A: When?
Q: In 2002 and 2003?
A: No. I remember being down in Utah with the kids. I remember exchanging
them at Malad with Russ. He took them. I remember picking them up again from
him and this happened a few times (Tr. pp. 496:25; 497:1-3; 22-25; 498:1;5-7; 1013;25; 499:1-3;10-13).
A few exchanges, which occurred eight years ago, is not a sufficient basis to make a
finding that a previous "visitation arrangement" had been worked out earlier in 2002-2003, and
that such an arrangement would be supportable and justified in the present custody order. In so
finding, the magistrate again abused its discretion.

7. The Magistrate Made Unsupported Findings Regarding Economic
Benefit To Laura In Relocating The Children To Utah
The magistrate rested part of his decision to allow Laura to move the minor children on
the premise that the move would be an economic benefit to Laura and would allow her to be a
stay-at-home mother. The magistrate's finding that Laura would be on welfare and church
assistance if she stayed in Idaho was based upon one statement that Laura made, nothing else.
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Speculative evidence was presented on the viability of Laura being able to support herself as a
stay-at-home mother in Utah. The evidence was clear that Laura made no effort to explore
alternative options in Idaho. Cumulatively, this evidence, or lack thereof, was insufficient for the
magistrate to find an economic benefit to Laura such that would rebut the presumption in favor
of the children having substantial physical custody with Russell.

8. The Lack Of Evidence Of Laura Being On Welfare If She Remained In Idaho
The magistrate made a specific finding on this issue that, "[i]fLaura stays in the Rigby,
Idaho area, she will be on welfare and will have to move from the marital home" (R. p. 389). The
only evidence during the entire course of the three day trial in this case which referenced welfare
or state aid came in an answer that Laura gave on cross examination when she was asked why it
was best for the children to move to Utah:
Because they would have a full-time mother and I would work with whatever I
needed to to get them up here, meet at the border, summers, holidays. It's either
stay here and not have a mother at all. I'd be on welfare, state programs,
whatever, I would need to go on church help, asking to borrow money from family
members . ... " (Tr. p. 455:13-19, emphasis added).
Laura's argument during all phases of the divorce proceeding was that she wanted to do
whatever was necessary to remain a stay-at-home mother. Laura did not submit a proposed
budget of her financial needs, nor did she present evidence regarding what type of other
assistance, including welfare, state aid, church assistance, or loans from her family that would be
necessary for her to remain a stay-at-home mother. There was insufficient evidence to support
the magistrate's finding that Laura would need assistance if she remained in Idaho.
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9. Laura Had Not Attempted To Investigate What Options Were Available
To Her In Idaho For Employment And/Or Education
Laura was asked what efforts she had made to investigate options to assist her to support
herself and the children, if were she to remain in Idaho.
Q: And you think that it is acceptable for the children to effectively move to Utah
and take Russ out of their lives? You think that's in their best interests?
A: In this situation, yes.
Q: And what's the situation?
A: A divorce. Tr. p. 452: 11-17
Q: [T]he truth of the matter is you've never considered, not once, any other option
[besides moving to Utah], correct?
A: If I want to be home with my children, that is the option.
Q: Just answer the question.
A: I just did.
Q: The only option you've considered is moving to Utah, right?
A: Yes.
Q: This divorce was filed in August of2009, now we're going on almost two
years on, you've not ever looked at getting a job here in Rigby or Idaho Falls?
A: No.
Q: You've not looked at educational opportunities in Idaho Falls or Pocatello?
A: No.
Q: Have you sought out any type of employment at all to supplement income?
A: No.
Q: Your singular objective has been to have this judge give you pem1ission to
take the children and move to Utah?
A: I would never work and compromise [the children], never.
Q: That's not the reality of the divorce, is it?
A: It's not, that's why I'm asking to move to Utah, so they can have a full-time
mother.
Q: Without their dad?
A: Without their dad.
Q: All right. And, again, you think that that is in their best interests not to have a
dad down in Utah?
A: Ifhe wants to move down, that's his choice
(Tr. pp. 453:20-25; 454:1-4; 11-25; 455: 1-5).
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How could the magistrate make a finding that Laura would be on welfare if she remained
in Idaho when it was abundantly clear that she provided no evidence related to her prospective
circumstance were she to remain? Laura's singular objective, as she testified, was to move with
the children to Utah. The magistrate also seemed focused in his objective to allow Laura to move
the children to Utah. Under Idaho law, the economic finding was wholly insufficient to rebut the
presumption in favor of Russell having substantial physical custody of the children. Laura's
simple assertion that Russell choose to move to Utah does not help resolve Laura's financial
needs. The magistrate's finding that she would be on welfare if she stayed in Idaho was
unsubstantiated and an abuse of discretion.

10. There Is Insufficient Evidence That Laura's
Financial Needs Would Be Met In Utah
Laura did not produce any evidence of her projected financial needs after the divorce,
whether she remained in Idaho or moved to Utah. Laura's only testimony was that she wanted to
stay at home with the children. It should be noted that all ofthe parties' children are presently
enrolled in preschool or school. The youngest children, the twins, tum five this year and will be
starting kindergarten (R. p. 380).
As an economic benefit to Laura, if she to move with the children to Utah, we know only
that: 1) her brother, Spencer Knight, would pay her $1,000 per month to start to perform
secretarial work for his business in Utah, and depending on how many hours she worked, her
earnings could increase that up to $2,000 per month (Tr. p. 105: 19-24); and 2) her father, Ronald
Knight, would provide her financial assistance if she and the children lived with him at his home
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in Utah (Tr. p. 110:3-11). Interestingly, when asked on cross-examination if Ronald would offer
any kind of financial assistance to Laura if her request to move the children to Utah was denied,
he stated, "I really don't feel that we ought to do that, across state lines and forward money and
pay for her up here" (Tr. p. 124: 1-7).
Given this vague and limited evidence, the magistrate found that if Laura were to move
with the children to Utah, "it would enhance [her] economic situation, in light of the fact that she
and the children could live rent free in [her] father's home. [Laura] could essentially be a stay-athome mother with the children, while earning income in her home by performing secretarial
services for her brother" (R. p. 390). There was insufficient evidence presented for the magistrate
to make this bold finding. Laura provided no evidence of her potential financial needs, nor how
much money she would need in order to meet those needs in order for her to stay at home. There
was no evidence presented regarding her need to stay home when all of the children were in
school at least part time, and were a short time away from being in school full time. This lack of
evidence did not assist Laura in meeting her burden to rebut Idaho law that favors Russell having
frequent physical custody of the children.

11. Laura Provided Insufficient Evidence Regarding The Children's
Best Interests In Moving To Utah
Laura was asked repeatedly about why she believed it was in the children's best interests
to move to Utah, away from Russell. Her reasons were as follows:
1. First and foremost, because the children would still have a mother, a mother in
the home, a mother being able to take care of their every need and being able
to be there for them in every way and I have a 14-year-old daughter and the
responsibilities that would be placed on her would be tremendous and she
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wouldn't have to have that pressure on her, I've thought about that
(Tr. p. 373:14-21).
2. I think the financial problems we're having would be greatly alleviated.
Because [Russell's] not making the money we need to support two households
and because I can get a job down there with my family in our family business.
(Tr. p. 448:5-10).
Laura recognized that her move with the children to Utah would take the children away
from Russell. She repeated throughout the trial, however, that she had repeatedly discussed the
prospect of Russell moving to Utah, too (Tr. p. 367-368). Laura acknowledged that the prospect
of having their five children moved away from one of the parents was a gut-wrenching one
(Tr. p. 450). Laura was asked, "[ cJan you imagine a more difficult circumstance for you than
having your children moved almost three hours away?" And her reply, "[t]hat's why I've spoken
to him several times about moving and he's agreed" (Tr. p. 450:8-12).
Russell conceded that he and Laura had discussed the option of moving to Utah during
numerous periods of reconciliation over the years, but moving "as a family" (Tr. p. 70:2-4).
Russell did not ever agree to move individually to Utah after the divorce. Russell believed that
the children needed the consistency of their home environment and also that his best
opportunities to continue to earn a living were in southeast Idaho (Tr. p. 71-72).
It is clear is that Laura knew and anticipated that a move to Utah with the children would

be "without their dad" (Tr. p. 455:2). Other than Laura's desire to be a stay-at-home mother and
to alleviate some of her financial difficulties, she could not provide any evidence about how such
a move would be in the children's best interests. Laura also failed to rebut the presumption in
favor of joint physical custody as defined by Idaho law.
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It is clear that Laura wanted to move to Utah for personal reasons. Laura testified that in
the Rigby area, and as a result of Russell's 2009 arrest, she felt "humiliated and I cannot imagine
continuing with this cloud over my head in this area" (Tr. p. 401 :25; 402: 1). The magistrate
made a specific finding consistent with Laura's testimony (R. p. 389). This finding does not
rebut the presumption for joint physical custody.

12. The Magistrate Ignored Evidence That Laura Had Been Specifically Hostile
To The Relationship Russell Had With The Children
Over the course of more than two years, the record reflects several instances when Laura
separated the children from Russell, only to have the Court reverse her course.
The first instance was in August, 2009, when Laura left the state with the children,
violating the JTRO. Laura stayed in Utah, until a Utah judge signed a Writ of Assistance
requiring her return to Idaho (R. p. 22, 37-39). The second instance followed a trip to Utah, when
Laura announced her intention not to return to the family home. This matter came to the Court's
attention in February, 2010. The judge again ordered Laura to return the children to the family
home and school (R. p. 175). The third instance involved Laura's filing of a Civil Protection
Order shortly after she had asked Russell to leave the home (Tr. P. 572, L. 9-10). This was not a
benign action; it caused Russell to be escorted from the family home by police in front of the
children and placed Russell's career as a professional counselor at peril.
Although the magistrate dismissed the CPO for lack of foundation (thereafter allowing
Russell to resume occupancy in the family home) he took no note of the action as it pertained to
the divorce or its ramifications regarding custody of the children.
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13. The Magistrate Failed To Weigh The Impact Of Travel
On The Parties' Minor Children
Google Maps calculates a distance from Laura's proposed residence in Utah to the
parties' family home in Rigby to be 242 miles, or exactly 3 hours and 59 minutes of travel each
way. Factoring in a minimum of 2 fifteen minute stops to accommodate the needs of the younger
children, this yields a total of nine hours travel time each weekend the children would be seeing
Russell. In other words, the children would be required to travel 1 hour for every 5.3 hours of
time the judge's order had afforded them with Russell. The magistrate did not account for the
effect this extensive travel would have on the children.

14. Russell Testified About Why It Was Not In The Children's
Best Interests To Move To Utah
Russell testified that the children moving to Utah would be "a significant barrier to the
continued parenting that I have always shown my children" (Tr. p. 64: 19-21). Russell testified
that the children should reside no further than 15 to 20 miles from their current residence, "so
they could continue to attend their current schools and their church and the other things that
provide for their stability in their lives at this time" (Tr. p. 72:7-12). Russell further stated that
Laura moving the children to Utah would, "be removing half of their lives from them"
(Tr. p. 560:12-13); that such a move "certainly would affect me greatly, but my greater concern
is the children and having had me every single day .... " (Tr. p. 72; 17-19). So desirous was
Russell that the children remain in close proximity to him that he offered to give Laura the entire
PERSI retirement plan valued at $33,000.00 to address some of her financial needs, if she were
to remain in Idaho (R. p. 383).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The magistrate abused its discretion in permitting Laura to move to Utah with the
children. For this reason, Russell respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
magistrate's decision and order that the children remain in Rigby, Idaho. The magistrate
further abused its discretion in granting primary physical custody to Laura with minimal
visitation to Russell. For this reason, Russell respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the magistrate's decision and order that the parties have joint physical custody of the
children pursuant the parenting plan recommended by Dr. Ruby Walker.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2012.
----~------~~~-------------'
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